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Although the focus in Washington lately has been on the deficit super committee and dashed hopes for “going big,” a new drama is playing out now in Congressional spending decisions for 2012. With Congress and the president having agreed to trim 2012 discretionary spending by $7 billion, our leaders have a unique opportunity to focus funding on programs that produce results, and thereby build a leaner, more cost-effective government. Can they seize the moment, or will it be business-as-usual and continued erosion in the people’s confidence?

We support program cuts as part of long-term deficit reduction, and realize that the magnitude of reductions needed over the next decade will require sacrifice from many Americans. However, the sacrifice could be minimized—and government performance maximized—if Congress uses evidence of effectiveness to decide where to spend and where to cut. In other words: Do what works!

Unfortunately, in the 2012 Congressional appropriations process, the House Appropriations Committee is taking the opposite approach in its main social spending bill. It would ramp up funding for programs that are politically popular, yet have been shown—in convincing scientific evaluations—to produce little or no improvement in people's lives. To help pay for the proposed increases and still meet Congress' deficit reduction targets, the committee would eliminate funding for newer federal programs that fund activities showing strong evidence of effectiveness, some of which may even save taxpayers money.

Only in the topsy-turvy world of Washington would programs that do not work get major funding increases, while programs that do work get cut.

Several of the programs slated for major funding increases are Great Society programs that many House Republicans have long opposed, but now propose to expand. The Department of Labor's $1.7 billion Job Corps program would see an increase of about $1 billion. The $7.6 billion Head Start program would get an additional $540 million. Both programs have been shown in large, federally-funded evaluations—using the scientific "gold standard" method of randomly assigning individuals to a program or control group—to produce few or no improvements in participants' lives. In other words, those not enrolled in these programs do about as well as those who are.

Similarly, the Department of Education's $14.5 billion Title I Grants and $11.5 billion Special Education Grants would each see billion-dollar increases. These programs award funding to school districts through formulas or other criteria that give no weight to whether the funded projects have evidence of effectiveness. Thus, we have no credible way to judge whether these programs are working, making them poor candidates for billion-dollar increases in a time of fiscal austerity.

There is a different way forward for Congress. It begins with realizing that funding programs shown to be ineffective is a species of government waste. By contrast, over the past four years, Congress has enacted a new type of social program—one which awards funding to state and local applicants based on the evidence of effectiveness underlying their proposals. Here the funding principle is exactly what is needed: evidence of success determines which projects get expanded, and which get reduced.

There are six new evidence-based initiatives across the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS), Education, and Labor, and the Corporation for National and Community Service. The House Appropriations Committee would eliminate or sharply reduce funding for all but one. Here the funding principle appears to be: if it works, cut it.

One initiative that would be ended is HHS's evidence-based Early Childhood Home Visiting Program, launched as a pilot under President Bush and expanded by President Obama. This initiative funds program models such as the Nurse-Family Partnership, which provides nurse-visitation services to low-income, first-time mothers. The model has been found highly effective in three rigorous randomized studies, producing sustained reductions of 20 to 50 percent in child abuse, neglect, and injuries. Moreover, one of the studies found an average reduction in the mothers' use of welfare, Food Stamps, and Medicaid of $13,000 over 12 years—more than offsetting the program's cost.

This program model is an ideal investment, improving the lives of children and mothers and generating savings in other government programs. Yet it is on the chopping block.

Another evidence-based initiative in jeopardy is the Department of Education's Investing in Innovation Fund. This initiative funds program models such as Success for All—a whole-school reform program for high-poverty elementary schools. Evaluated in a national randomized study in grades K-2, Success for All increased schoolwide reading ability in second grade by 25 to 30 percent of a grade level, at a very modest cost per school—roughly the equivalent of hiring one additional teacher.

When the House and Senate reconcile their spending bills this fall, they should fully support these new evidence-based initiatives. As for larger programs like Job Corps and Title I—these should be reformed so that they, too, use evidence in their funding decisions. For example, whereas Title I funding is now allocated to school districts based on how many poor students they serve, a half percent of the funds could be used to reward these districts for adopting program models shown to actually work for poor students—or for trying new models that would be rigorously evaluated.

The new evidence-based initiatives are cost-effective investments—exactly what is needed to optimize benefits for individuals and the nation in a tight budgetary climate. Distributing social spending the old-fashioned way—with maximum regard for political gain and minimum regard for evidence of effectiveness—is a luxury we can no longer afford.

To what extent is demography destiny in politics? That’s the question that Ruy Teixeira and John Halpin’s much-discussed analysis of the 2012 presidential race puts front and center.

Teixeira and Halpin posit that the balance of two forces, “the shifting demographic balance of the American electorate, and the objective reality and voter perception of the economy in key battleground states,” will likely determine the outcome of Obama’s reelection. At that level of generality, it’s hard to disagree. But I would argue that while demography matters, it is not as significant as Teixeira and Halpin believe. Yes, it makes a difference that Obama’s winning 2008 coalition relied on growing segments of the electorate while the traditional, mostly white Republican base is fated to shrink, election after election. But other things matter at least as much—especially the impact of the past three years on the orientation and enthusiasm of the Obama coalition, for reasons not all of which are rooted in the economy. Put simply: If Obama’s margins shrink among young people, Hispanics, and other key parts of his base while disappointment depresses their turnout, the falloff in Obama’s support will swamp the modest post-2008 demographic shifts in his favor.

While Teixeira and Halpin don’t disagree with my thesis (it’s a matter of simple arithmetic, after all), they systematically underplay the evidence suggesting that it may well come to pass. To redress the imbalance, let’s look at the most recent Gallup numbers from the week of November 21 to 27. Obama’s overall approval rating stood at 43 percent, as it has for more than a month—a level inconsistent with a successful reelection campaign unless there’s a significant third party candidate on the right.

For present purposes, it’s the details below the top line that matter. Specifically:

• Support for Obama among young voters ages 18 to 29 has plunged to only 48 percent.
   
• His approval among Hispanics stands at only 51 percent.
   
• With the exception of voters with post-graduate degrees, Obama is under water with every educational cohort: 42 percent among those with a high school diploma or less, 41 percent among those with some college, and 41 percent for voters with BAs.
   
• While his approval among Democrats and liberals remains robust (79 and 71 percent, respectively), he stands at only 39 percent among Independents and 51 percent among moderates—about 10 points below what Democrats need from these two categories to win national popular vote majorities.
   
• While the gulf between married voters and unmarried ones persists, Obama’s approval among unmarried voters stands at only 51 percent.

Compare these numbers with the shares of the vote Obama received from these groups in November 2008:



It’s clear that Obama’s margins are down—way down—not just among swing voters, but in the core of his coalition as well. Compounding the problem, the base’s enthusiasm and intensity have declined as well. As Gerald Seib has noted, while Democrats won the intensity race hands-down in 2008, the reverse is the case today. In the most recent NBC/WSJ poll, 56 percent of Republicans said that they were more enthusiastic than usual, versus only 43 percent of Democrats, and 59 percent of conservatives profess to be more enthusiastic than usual, versus only 38 percent of liberals. Over the past year, every survey has found these same disparities.

The bottom line is that unless things turn around considerably in the next eleven months, key parts of Obama’s winning 2008 coalition are poised to deliver both lower margins and smaller shares of the electorate than they did in 2008. (In general elections, actual votes closely mirror pre-election approval ratings.) If the election were held tomorrow against the most credible Republican challenger, the president would probably lose.

Demography shapes political orientations, of course. But so do events. And this is especially true for voters who don’t enter the political arena with well-established views and habits. While there’s good reason to believe that today’s young adults will remain more comfortable with diversity—of race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation—than are their parents and grandparents, there’s no guarantee that this will translate into a liberal or pro-government orientation across the board. A thought-experiment: Suppose a Republican were to win the presidency in 2012, implemented a broadly conservative economic agenda, and that after four years the job market for young adults had improved substantially. Is it plausible that this scenario would have no impact on their long-term political orientation?

Similarly, while Obama received fully two-thirds of the votes from the fastest growing ethnic group in the U.S. population, the impact of his failure to enact—or even to push hard for—immigration reform is likely to be substantial. To be sure, few Republicans even espouse such an agenda. Still, it would not be unfair for Latinos to conclude that as things stand, neither party gives them much ground for hope.

Since the financial collapse began four years ago, events at home and abroad have disrupted Americans’ settled expectations. It would be prudent to assume that this will have a measurable impact on their political orientation as well. While it’s harder to predict the overall direction of these attitudinal changes, they may well tug against the influence of demography and reconfigure the political playing field.

Demography isn’t destiny. But neither is anything else. Americans’ political outlook will be shaped by the choices their leaders make, and even more by the consequences of those choices.

To what extent is demography destiny in politics? That’s the question that Ruy Teixeira and John Halpin’s much-discussed analysis of the 2012 presidential race puts front and center.

Teixeira and Halpin posit that the balance of two forces, “the shifting demographic balance of the American electorate, and the objective reality and voter perception of the economy in key battleground states,” will likely determine the outcome of Obama’s reelection. At that level of generality, it’s hard to disagree. But I would argue that while demography matters, it is not as significant as Teixeira and Halpin believe. Yes, it makes a difference that Obama’s winning 2008 coalition relied on growing segments of the electorate while the traditional, mostly white Republican base is fated to shrink, election after election. But other things matter at least as much—especially the impact of the past three years on the orientation and enthusiasm of the Obama coalition, for reasons not all of which are rooted in the economy. Put simply: If Obama’s margins shrink among young people, Hispanics, and other key parts of his base while disappointment depresses their turnout, the falloff in Obama’s support will swamp the modest post-2008 demographic shifts in his favor.

While Teixeira and Halpin don’t disagree with my thesis (it’s a matter of simple arithmetic, after all), they systematically underplay the evidence suggesting that it may well come to pass. To redress the imbalance, let’s look at the most recent Gallup numbers from the week of November 21 to 27. Obama’s overall approval rating stood at 43 percent, as it has for more than a month—a level inconsistent with a successful reelection campaign unless there’s a significant third party candidate on the right.

For present purposes, it’s the details below the top line that matter. Specifically:

• Support for Obama among young voters ages 18 to 29 has plunged to only 48 percent.
   
• His approval among Hispanics stands at only 51 percent.
   
• With the exception of voters with post-graduate degrees, Obama is under water with every educational cohort: 42 percent among those with a high school diploma or less, 41 percent among those with some college, and 41 percent for voters with BAs.
   
• While his approval among Democrats and liberals remains robust (79 and 71 percent, respectively), he stands at only 39 percent among Independents and 51 percent among moderates—about 10 points below what Democrats need from these two categories to win national popular vote majorities.
   
• While the gulf between married voters and unmarried ones persists, Obama’s approval among unmarried voters stands at only 51 percent.

Compare these numbers with the shares of the vote Obama received from these groups in November 2008:



It’s clear that Obama’s margins are down—way down—not just among swing voters, but in the core of his coalition as well. Compounding the problem, the base’s enthusiasm and intensity have declined as well. As Gerald Seib has noted, while Democrats won the intensity race hands-down in 2008, the reverse is the case today. In the most recent NBC/WSJ poll, 56 percent of Republicans said that they were more enthusiastic than usual, versus only 43 percent of Democrats, and 59 percent of conservatives profess to be more enthusiastic than usual, versus only 38 percent of liberals. Over the past year, every survey has found these same disparities.

The bottom line is that unless things turn around considerably in the next eleven months, key parts of Obama’s winning 2008 coalition are poised to deliver both lower margins and smaller shares of the electorate than they did in 2008. (In general elections, actual votes closely mirror pre-election approval ratings.) If the election were held tomorrow against the most credible Republican challenger, the president would probably lose.

Demography shapes political orientations, of course. But so do events. And this is especially true for voters who don’t enter the political arena with well-established views and habits. While there’s good reason to believe that today’s young adults will remain more comfortable with diversity—of race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation—than are their parents and grandparents, there’s no guarantee that this will translate into a liberal or pro-government orientation across the board. A thought-experiment: Suppose a Republican were to win the presidency in 2012, implemented a broadly conservative economic agenda, and that after four years the job market for young adults had improved substantially. Is it plausible that this scenario would have no impact on their long-term political orientation?

Similarly, while Obama received fully two-thirds of the votes from the fastest growing ethnic group in the U.S. population, the impact of his failure to enact—or even to push hard for—immigration reform is likely to be substantial. To be sure, few Republicans even espouse such an agenda. Still, it would not be unfair for Latinos to conclude that as things stand, neither party gives them much ground for hope.

Since the financial collapse began four years ago, events at home and abroad have disrupted Americans’ settled expectations. It would be prudent to assume that this will have a measurable impact on their political orientation as well. While it’s harder to predict the overall direction of these attitudinal changes, they may well tug against the influence of demography and reconfigure the political playing field.

Demography isn’t destiny. But neither is anything else. Americans’ political outlook will be shaped by the choices their leaders make, and even more by the consequences of those choices.